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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of technological opportunities and knowledge
tacitness on inter-firm network formation, under two different industry regimes. In the first
regime environment is stable and the aim of firms is to exploit knowledge. In this case, they
attribute more value to repeated interactions with geographically close firms. In the second
regime, there is environmental turbulence, which increases the value of access to novelties from
distant partners for the purpose of exploration. The question addressed is, under these regimes
how do technological opportunities and knowledge tacitness influence structure of networks? A
simulation model is carried out where firms select partners and learn from them, which further
shapes their selection process. How the macro structure of the network is shaped from the
individual partner selection decisions of firms is analysed. The results reveal that in both
regimes richer technological opportunities and higher tacitness generates local and global star
firms depending on the parameter range.
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 Introduction
1.1
It is now acknowledged that external interactions of a firm are vital for its competitive
advantage. In the literature, one of the main incentives to form external linkages has been
shown to be organizational learning. According to this literature one of the motives of firms in
forming linkages with other firms is learning. The pioneering paper has been that of Powell et
al. (1996), where they state that firms network with each other because they seek to explore
and exploit knowledge bases. In particular, their seminal work on biotechnology places the
concept of organizational learning at the heart of the network literature. Distinguishing between
exploration and exploitation dimensions of organizational learning, the former refers to
experimentation with new alternatives, and the latter to the "exercise of refinement and
extension of existing competencies, technologies and paradigms" (March 1991: 85).
Interactions between firms not only enhance learning about new developments, but also
strengthen internal competencies and thus the locus of innovation is found in the networks of
learning (Powell et al. 1996).
1.2
Previous studies reveal that whether a firm collaborates for the purpose of exploring or
exploiting depends on the external conditions (Rowley et al. 2000) like the stage in the industry
life cycle or the growth phase of the firm. Some recent studies examine in detail the motivations
for exploration versus exploitation alliances, in the context of life cycle of the firm (Oliver 2001),
industry life cycle (Rothaermel and Deeds 2004) effects of uncertainty and industry life cycle
(Beckman et al. 2004). According to Rowley et al. (2000) firms in turbulent environments may
benefit more from exploring knowledge, while firms in more stable environments can prefer to
deepen their existing knowledge through their external contacts (Rowley et al., 2000). In
addition they point out that exploration is carried out effectively by constructing weak links with
distant firms, while exploitation happens through strong ties and repeated interactions with
other firms. These results also have implications for the debate between social capital and
structural hole proponents in the literature.
1.3
Proponents of the social capital view (Coleman 1988) argue that, taking place in dense networks
with embedded relations (Granovetter 1985) in which interactions are accompanied with thick
knowledge exchange, and which are frequent and face to face, helps to build trust among the
parties, so that concerns for reputation mitigate possible opportunistic behavior. Networks richin social capital facilitate transfer of tacit knowledge since a common language is developed
among the parties, which increases efficiency in terms of time and costs of negotiation (Uzzi
1997). It has also been shown that in industries where knowledge is highly tacit, a clustered
network structure facilitates the flow of knowledge (Cowan et al. 2004; Audretsch and Feldman
1996). On the other hand, too much embeddedness can have counter effects, like rendering the
firm vulnerable to external shocks or insulating it from novel knowledge residing elsewhere in
the network (Uzzi 1997).
1.4
Inspired from Granovetter's leading arguments on the strength of weak ties (Granovetter 1973),
proponents of structural holes argue that networks rich in social capital result in redundancy of
knowledge exchange, since the same parties interact frequently. As they argue, firms should fill
structural holes in the network, and act as " bridges" connecting otherwise disconnected
clusters of firms (Burt 1992). These weak ties are advantageous in terms of getting access to
novel knowledge from diverse sources, thus beneficial for exploration purposes and when the
knowledge being transferred is more codified (Rowley et al. 2000). It is argued that especially in
technologically turbulent environments, a firms' access to novel knowledge is critical for
competitive advantage. Weak ties also have the benefit of giving the firm flexibility in adapting
to new circumstances (Gargiulo and Benassi 2000; Uzzi 1997). One of the disadvantages of
filling structural holes is that the flow of tacit knowledge is constrained, which can mitigate
innovative performance, as observed in the case of chemicals (Ahuja 2000).
1.5
These studies reveal that the overall network structure among firms in an industry depends on
the industrial conditions. This is because under different conditions of the industry firms may
use different criteria to construct external linkages. This observation is the starting point of this
paper. In particular the question addressed in this paper is, what are the characteristics of the
overall network structure when firms individually select other firms under different conditions
of the industry? In addressing this question, it is assumed that 1) firms interact with each other
with the objective of organizational learning, in the form of exploration or exploitation of their
knowledge bases and 2) industrial conditions shape with whom firms want to interact. In the
paper, interactions are taken as informal meetings of firms, where they are short term and do
not require significant commitment in terms of resources. These can be resembled to
interactions that happen through working groups, task forces or technical committees, in which
learning from other firms is the main outcome (Rosenkopf et al. 2001).
1.6
Because many firms select partners in a decentralised manner based on their own self interest,
the overall structure of networks that emerge cannot be predicted a priori. An agent-based
simulation model is a promising avenue to explore the overall consequences of individual
decisions, and how the macro structure of the network emerges from the micro decisions of
each firm in the industry. In defining industrial conditions, we focus on three dimensions as
turbulence, tacitness of knowledge and technological opportunities. The results reveal that
depending on the parameter space defined by technological opportunities, knowledge tacitness
and turbulence, local and global star firms are likely to emerge in the network, who have more
connections than other firms.
1.7
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we explain the model. In the third




The aim of the model is to highlight the characteristics of networks that emerge when firms
voluntarily select partners under different industry conditions. The intuition behind the model is
that firms will have different partner selection criteria under different conditions of the industry.
The question addressed is, what types of networks emerge under three industry dimensions as
technological opportunities, tacitness of knowledge and turbulence? The model is based on four
premises:
(A1) Firms construct external linkages for the purpose of organizational learning, in the
form of exploration or exploitation;
(A2) In stable environments firms are willing to exploit, and firms in turbulent
environments are willing to explore (Rowley et al. 2000) [1];
(A3) Constructing strong ties is better for exploiting knowledge, and constructing weak
ties is better for exploring new knowledge (Rowley et al. 2000);
(A4) As knowledge becomes more and more tacit, a firm needs to interact more frequently
with geographically close firms (i.e. strong ties) to increase its extent of learning (Cowan
et al. 2004; Audretsch and Feldman 1996; Uzzi 1997).
2.2
There are two stages in the model. In the first stage firms select partners. In the second stage
firms learn from their partners and in this way knowledge diffuses. Below, these stages are
explained in detail, followed by a description of the algorithm of the model explaining how
these stages are linked.
Selection of Partners2.3
In the first stage of the model, firms select other firms by assigning an expected value to a
potential interaction. This expected value depends on the industry conditions and the perceived
level of the other firm's knowledge.
2.4
Mathematically, when ego firm i is choosing among other firms, it assigns the following value to
an interaction with firm j [2];
(1)
where we define the function s(.,.) as
vij the value of collaboration between firm i and j, kj is the knowledge level of firm j, βij is a
parameter to account for the error term that firm i might commit in forming its expectation
regarding the value of its collaboration with firm j, hij is the number of times firm i and j have
collaborated in the past, dij is the geographical distance between firms i and j, and α is a
parameter that we vary to control for stability of the industry and tacitness of knowledge.
According to Equation (1), the higher is the value of firm j's knowledge, the more value firm i
places on their collaboration.
2.5
The parameter α measures the first two dimensions of industry regime. The sign of α controls
for stability of industry, and the magnitude of α controls for the tacitness of knowledge. The
term exploitation regime is used for industries which are more stable, and the term exploration
regime is used for industries in which there is high instability (from A2 above).
2.6
In Equation (1), values of α < 0 represent an exploitation regime, which refers to an industry
which is relatively stable. This means that, firms would find it more beneficial to deepen their
knowledge in a specific field, rather than to explore new knowledge (from A2 above). Therefore,
the value that a firm assigns to a potential partner will increase with greater number of past
interactions and less distance between them (from A3 above). The logistic curve with α < 0
enables us to model these aspects of firm valuation as shown in Figure 1. Two aspects of this
function is important. Firstly, given a level of partner's knowledge kj value that a firm assigns to
a partnership (vij) is positively related with number of past meetings ( ), and negatively
related with distance between two firms ( ).
2.7
Secondly, we would expect that as the number of meetings between two firms increase, the
marginal value of each meeting first increases and then falls. This is because in the beginning
firms do not know each other sufficiently well and they have more to learn from each other. As
firms get to know each other after sufficient meetings, there is less to be gained from each
meeting. This implies that in the beginning two firms will have more contribution to make to
each other, and soon after the marginal contribution starts falling. In the functional form used
in Equation (1), this implies that  .[3] Only when the marginal contribution of collaboration
is zero, firms achieve the full benefits from their meetings. These features of the functional
form employed can be seen in Figure 1. Based on Equation 1, for a given level of partner's
knowledge, the value that firm assigns to its meeting with firm j is increasing in the number of
previous meetings divided by their distance. Two additional features of the logistic function are
important for the model:
(AS1) Shift of the curve to the right (thick solid line in Figure 1) : As the absolute value of α
gets smaller (rightward shift of the curve) knowledge becomes more and more difficult to
transfer via meetings. In other words, acquiring the same level of benefit from a
collaboration requires more meetings and/or shorter distance. From (A4) above, the effect
of an increase in tacitness results in more frequent interactions with closer neighbours.
Thus, the model assumes that more frequent interactions is due to the fact that the level
of tacitness of knowledge has increased.
(AS2) Change in the slope (thick solid line in Figure 1): As the absolute value of α gets
smaller, the slope of the curve decreases. In this way the function also captures an
important effect. As knowledge becomes increasingly tacit, the marginal value of past
meetings over history falls. For an ego firm, this means that there is very little difference
in terms of expected value, of connecting to an immediate neighbour, or else the one next
to the immediate neighbour, because in any case knowledge transfer is far too limited in
both cases.
2.8
In the exploitation regime, the magnitude of alpha controls for knowledge tacitness. How
sensitive is the value of a collaboration to the number of previous interactions and distance (i.e.
the extent of tacitness of knowledge, α) is a parameter we vary under this regime. In anexploitation regime, firms seek to build strong ties with close neighbours, and more competent
firms are more attractive for a firm based on Equation 1. Therefore, when a firm makes a
decision to select a partner, it values closer partners with whom it has met more in the past, as
well as who are more competent.
2.9
Values of α > 0 represent an exploration regime, which characterizes a turbulent environment.
This is shown in the exploration regime part of Figure 1. In this regime, more distant and novel
collaborations yield more value, because opportunity cost of committing resources to the same
partner increases (based on A2 above). In this case, there is no additional value to be derived
from repeated interactions. On the contrary, novel partners are what firms are looking for, to
access novel sources of knowledge and to gain knowledge about recent developments
elsewhere in the network. As in the case of an exploitation regime, in an exploration regime, as
value of α falls knowledge becomes more tacit. In other words, it requires more past meetings
and/or closer distance to achieve a certain level of benefit. This is shown by a rightward shift of
the exploration curve in Figure 1, demonstrated by the thick dashed line.
2.10
To summarize, the sign of α controls for the industry regime which we characterize by the
extent of turbulence in the environment, while its magnitude controls for the tacitness of
knowledge in both regimes. Firms select partners according to the industry regime, and the
tacitness of the knowledge, using Equation 1.
Figure 1.
2.11
Figure 1 shows function v(.,.) in Equation 1 for a given level of knowledge of the partner. The
vertical axis shows the perceived value of a collaboration for the ego firm, with potential
partner. Horizontal axis shows the status of the relationship between ego firm and the partner,
which is given by number of past meetings between ego firm i and firm j, divided by distance
between them. In an exploitation regime, value of collaboration is increasing in number of past
meetings divided by distance. In an exploration regime, value of collaboration falls with number
of past meetings divided by distance between the two firms.
Diffusion
2.12
In the second stage of the model, every firm selects a partner by choosing the one to whom it
has attributed the highest value by Equation 1, and firms interact. It is assumed that cost of
connections are negligible, and forming a link does not require the consent of the other firm.
Although these two assumptions can be considered as strong, cost of connections and mutual
consent usually depend on the type of connection being made. Here it is assumed that the type
of contacts between firms are based on informal meetings which are usually short term, and
have important learning effects. These can occur in the context of working groups, task forces,
or technical committees. In such interactions, the costs of connection for a firm is quite low in
terms of the resources committed (Oliver 1991). Moreover, in such meetings significant degree
of knowledge spillovers occur, and such informal contacts usually result in the establishment of
more formal alliances between firms (Rosenkopf et al. 2001).
2.13
In each period each firm contacts another firm (we assume that self collaborations yield zero
value). A firm may have contact with many other firms, if it is selected by them. After partners
are selected, the firms learn from each other, their knowledge levels are updated and the period
ends. In the next period they select partners again with their updated knowledge levels.
2.14
The extent of learning depends on the three dimensions of the industry regime. The first two
dimensions are explained above as turbulence and tacitness. The third dimension is
technological opportunities, which is introduced in this part. Here it is assumed that when firms
are making their decisions, they have an estimation of the partner's knowledge level (given
above in Equation 1), but they are not farsighted enough to estimate what they can learn fromtheir partners, given the combination of their own knowledge and the partner's knowledge.
2.15
In an exploitation regime, the more two firms have met in the past and the closer they are, the
more they can learn from each other. On the other hand, in an exploration regime, the less they
have met in the past and the more distant they are, the more they can learn from each other. In
addition, industries with higher technological opportunities yield more learning.
2.16
At the end of one period, firm i learns from the collaboration with firm j according to[4]
(2)
where we define g(.,.) as
with
(3)
where sij is as explained in Equation (1). Equation (2) tells that, the extent of learning depends
on a) history and distance as revealed by function s(.,.) and b) technological opportunities.
Technological opportunities are measured by parameter γ which is the third dimension of the
industry regime. According to function g(.,.) learning in a collaboration depends on the relative
knowledge levels between firms i and j. In modelling increases in a firm's knowledge as a result
of the receipt of new knowledge (See Cowan et al. 2004 for this type of learning function):
(AD1) The resultant knowledge level is continuous in the initial level of the ego firm;
(AD2) If the ego firm knows more than the partner, the knowledge level of the ego firm
does not change;
(AD3) When the ego firm's knowledge level is small relative to that of the partner, the
increment to its knowledge decreases as it falls further behind;
(AD4) It is in general possible for an ego firm to leapfrog the partner, achieving a higher
knowledge level than the partner after the collaboration.
Figure 2 Absorption and Innovation
2.17
Parameter γ measures two aspects of learning: absorption of knowledge and innovation. In
Figure 2(a) and (b), the horizontal axis shows the relative knowledge levels of the ego firm i and
partner j before collaboration, and the vertical axis shows the relative knowledge levels after
collaboration. Here, the 45° line to the right of rij=1 reveals that it is only possible to learn from
more advanced people. If firm i has more knowledge than firm j, rij > 1 and firm i's knowledge
does not change. When γ = 1, there is only absorption shown by the vertical lines. In Figure
2(b), there is both absorption and new knowledge creation (i.e. leapfrogging). When the relative
knowledge levels before collaboration are above the critical threshold rc (1 > rij > rc ), the less
knowledgeable firm i increases its knowledge over and above that of firm j in the next period.
This area is revealed by the horizontal lines, where the new relative knowledge levels are bigger
than one. The horizontal lines show the areas of innovation. As γ increases further, the
possibilities for innovation increase. Therefore in this model γ measures the potential of the
industry to innovate (Cowan et al. 2004).
2.18
In addition to technological opportunities, the history of a partnership as a determinant oflearning and networks is also taken into account in Equation (2) with function s(.,.) as explained
in the selection process.
2.19
The reasoning behind the learning function Equation (2) is as follows. Let us think of an industry
in which technological opportunities are very high. This implies that when two firms meet, for γ
> 1 the firm who knows less has even the chance to leapfrog the partner as implied by function
g(.,.). However, if it is an exploitation regime where knowledge is highly tacit, its diffusion
between two firms will be more constrained than a regime in which knowledge is more codified
(i.e. α < 0 and higher absolute values of α). Therefore, tacitness is a factor which inhibits the
ego firm from fully utilizing technological opportunities, unless it has met with the partner firm
sufficiently before. This is how the history of meetings matter. As implied by function s(.,.) in
Equation (2) the more two firms have met in the past, the more chances they will have to fully
utilize technological opportunities by counterfeiting the negative effect of difficulties in
knowledge transfer. When knowledge is relatively more codified, these problems are of no
concern. In this case history matters less for utilization of technological opportunities since its
transfer is relatively easier. This function captures these aspects of the knowledge diffusion
process. In short, it tells that the more tacit knowledge is, the more important it is that two
firms have met more in the past (or be closer to each other geographically) to be able to capture
a certain amount of technological opportunities.
Figure 3 Relative Knowledge Levels under different levels of Technological Opportunities and
Tacitness
2.20
These effects are shown in Figure 3. The initial knowledge proportion is 0.9. Higher
technological opportunities (square markers) yield higher knowledge creation. But if knowledge
is highly tacit (filled squares) making the most of opportunities requires more meetings in the
past and/or shorter distance between partners. The same is valid for low technological
opportunities, which yield less chances for knowledge creation (triangle markers).
2.21
Once diffusion occurs, knowledge levels of firms are updated, and in the next period, process
of partner selection is repeated. We look into the types of networks that emerge and the
distribution of knowledge among firms, in the parameter space defined by technological
opportunities, type of regime (i.e. exploration or exploitation) and the tacitness of knowledge.
A Summary of the Simulation Model
2.22
A brief description of the model is as follows. In period t = 0 the initial knowledge levels of
firms and parameter values are set. In the beginning of the period, each firm assigns to every
other firm an expected value of collaboration using Equation 1. Next each firm forms a
connection to the firm which it has assigned the highest value. In this way a network forms and
it is recorded. In this scheme, each firm selects one partner. But some firms might be selected
by many other firms. Therefore in the network, each of the firms have at least one connection.
After selection of partners, firms learn from their neighbours. Learning takes place via Equation
2. Knowledge levels of the firms are updated, which marks the end of the period. Links are
deleted, and the second period begins with the updated knowledge levels. The same loop is
repeated. After sufficient periods elapse, the frequency matrix is obtained (showing who
interacted with whom and how many times) and the simulation run ends. The parameter values




The population consists of N = 30 firms, who are located on a circle. Each firm i is endowed
with a knowledge scalar, ki assigned randomly (drawn from a uniform distribution) at period t =
0; ki shows the level of firm i's knowledge. Firms are endowed with different knowledge levels.The main parameters that we vary are α, which measures a) the industry regime (α < 0) for
exploitation regime and α > 0 for exploration regime), and b) tacitness of knowledge (higher
values connote higher tacitness) and γ which measures technological opportunities. In the
simulations, α 㱨 [-2,2], β 㱨 [0.9,1.1] and γ 㱨 [1,7]. Because the aim of the model is to highlight
the type of networks that emerge under different conditions of the industry, we look at
measures of network structure in the parameter space defined by α and γ. For this purpose,
social network analysis tools are used. One simulation run consists of 1000 periods. At the end
of the 1000 periods, we record frequency matrices, showing the number of times firms have
formed links. We run 10 simulations for each of the parameter combinations, and the results
correspond to the average of network measures. We analyse the resulting networks using social
network analysis tools. In particular, we look at the degree of localization of links, reachability
among firms and centrality of the networks.
Spatial Strength
3.2
Firstly, we measure the extent to which firms in the network form strong ties. As we use the
term, strength of a tie has two dimensions; firstly it measures the extent to which the tie is
constructed with a geographically close firm, and second the number of times the tie is
repeated between two firms. For this purpose, the spatial strength index measures the extent to
which they interact frequently with close neighbours. This is given by;
where dij is the distance between firms i and j, and hij is the number of times i and j have
collaborated. The average is taken over all firms in the population. Higher values of the spatial
strength index reflect the tendency in the population to form strong ties with close firms. Lower
values of the index reflect a tendency to form weak ties with distant firms. Figure 4 shows this
measure.
Figure 4 Spatial Strength Index
3.3
In an exploitation regime, firms learn more by forming strong ties with close neighbours.
Therefore, the absolute values of the spatial strength index is high compared to the exploration
regime, in which networks are more dense and ties more diversified. In an exploitation regime,
choosing a close neighbour and forming a link repeatedly enables a firm to utilize more
technological opportunities that he can get from this partnership. But as knowledge tacitness
increases, the spatial strength index falls. Indeed, this result is a consequence of AS2. The
results are further discussed below in relation to other network measures.
3.4
An important aspect of the model is that forming a tie does not require the consent of the
partner. Any firm can form a link with any other firm. Therefore this aspect of the model permits




Degree centrality in a network is measured as follows;
where cmax is the degree of the firm with the highest connections, ci is the degrees of actor i.The term in the denominator gives the maximum possible value of difference among all actors
(Wasserman and Faust 1994).
Figure 5 Degree Centrality
3.6
Figure 5 shows that in both regimes, centrality increases with tacitness. At the same time, in
industries with higher technological opportunities, centrality of the networks are higher. In the
exploitation regime, it was observed that when technological opportunities are higher and
knowledge more codified, there are local stars, which is evident from high spatial strength
(Figure 4) accompanied by high centralization. As knowledge becomes more tacit, these local
stars are replaced by global stars, as evidenced by even higher degree centrality of the
networks. To see the extent to which the firms are connected to each other, we also looked at
the reachability of firms in the network.
Reachability
3.7
Reachability of the network measures the extent to which two nodes are accessible to each
other directly or via intermediaries.[5] For higher technological opportunities and codified
knowledge, we mentioned above that there are local stars in the network. In Figure 6 it is
possible to see that in this range the reachability depends on technological opportunities. As
technological opportunities rise, firms are more connected to each other, accompanied by local
stars (Figure 5), and strong ties (Figure 4). In an exploration regime, it is an expected result that





In an exploitation regime, firms can learn more from a partner the more they have met before,
and the less distance between them. Although this generates a magnet effect which attracts
firms to repeat links with close neighbours, this magnet effect diminishes because of two
reasons: increasing tacitness, and increased technological opportunities. These are observed in
Figure 4 where spatial strength index falls as technological opportunities and tacitness increase.
4.2
The loosening of local interactions when knowledge is more tacit might seem contradictory tomost empirical evidence, which reveals that tacitness of the knowledge base increases
clustering. However, this result is hardly surprising in this model, because it is imposed by the
functional form employed. This is a consequence of AS2, which states that the difference
between connecting to an immediate neighbour, or else connecting to a firm in the vicinity is
lower as tacitness increases. As expected, this creates a loosening of the connections towards
more distant partners, which reduces strength of ties.
4.3
At the same time, it is observed that this localization is loosened when technological
opportunities are higher. Moreover, an interesting effect of technological opportunities on
network structure is that when knowledge is codified, higher technological opportunities
generate "local stars", whereas as knowledge becomes more tacit, higher technological
opportunities generate "global" stars. This can be explained by the two forces operating in
opposite directions as explained below.
4.4
When an ego firm is making a decision to select partners, it can take into account the partner's
knowledge level, and also their history and distance (see Equation (1)). The network structure
that emerges is a result of the effect that dominates. If knowledge effect dominates, firms care
less about their history and distance, but more about the knowledge of the partner and we see
loosening of localization. For example, when knowledge of the potential partner is too high, it
becomes too attractive to be ignored for the ego firm, so instead of commitment to making
strong ties with close firms, it can select the star firm. If history effect dominates, firms care
more about forming strong ties with close neighbours, regardless of their knowledge level. The
process works in the following way.
Codified Knowledge and High Technological Opportunities: Local Stars
4.5
When knowledge is relatively codified, it is obvious that the history effect is more dominant (by
axiom AS2), so firms have a tendency to form strong ties with close partners. Here, as
technological opportunities increase firms have more chances to leapfrog the knowledge of
their partners, provided that their relative knowledge levels are close (see Equation (2)). In this
case, some lucky firms have neighbours whose knowledge levels are close to themselves. These
firms can easily leapfrog their partners, and they have more chances to innovate. As this
process takes place, they become more attractive for the other firms in the vicinity. In other
words, having a firm in the vicinity whose knowledge becomes significantly higher than others
attracts other firms to the star firm. For these peripheral firms, this is the case where the
knowledge effect starts dominating the history effect, because there is a firm in the vicinity
whose knowledge is too big to ignore. Because transfer of knowledge is easier when knowledge
is codified, the knowledge gap between peripheral firms and the star firm does not grow too
much. Therefore star firms always remain as the local stars, without being able to extend their
field of attraction to all the network. This is why the centrality is higher for higher technological
opportunities in Figure 5, which also corresponds to the region where spatial strength is high.
In this way, the spatial strength because of less tacit knowledge, and the loosening effect
because of higher technological opportunities yield the emergence of local stars.
Tacit Knowledge and High Technological Opportunities: Global Stars
4.6
As knowledge becomes more and more tacit, axiom AS2 tells that spatial strength will be lower
in the network as explained above. In this case, the knowledge effect can dominate the history
effect. Therefore firms will have a tendency to prefer knowledgeable partners to forming strong
ties with close neighbours. However, in this case knowledge is relatively more difficult to
transfer. Some lucky firms who have neighbours with similar knowledge levels in the vicinity
start innovating. This time, however, because it is relatively difficult to transfer knowledge, the
gap between these firms and peripheral firms keeps increasing and peripheral firms fall further
behind (see axiom AD3). This is how some firms become more and more attractive, and extend
their field of attraction to other firms in the network, and eventually they become "global" stars.
4.7
To confirm these results, we also looked at the knowledge gap among firms, measured by the
standard deviation of knowledge in the population. Figure 7 gives this measure. As it can be
seen, both technological opportunities and tacitness of knowledge have the effect of increasing
the knowledge gap among firms.Figure 7 Average Reachability among Network Members
Exploration Regime
4.8
In an exploration regime, firms want to meet new and distant firms to be informed about
knowledge residing elsewhere in the network other than in close vicinity. The results reveal that
in an exploration regime, the same rules hold as for the exploitation regime. More specifically,
higher technological opportunities and knowledge tacitness increase centrality (Figure 5). The
main difference between the exploration and exploitation regimes in terms of networks is that,
in the former case networks are denser, and thus spatial strength index is lower (Figure 4).
Figure 6 shows that in an exploration regime, all nodes are reachable from each other as a
result.
4.9
To interpret these results, let us think of the two forces at work in partner selection; knowledge
of the partner and history of interactions. Contrary to the exploitation case, here the dilemma
that a firm faces is whether to connect weakly to a distant firm and have access to novelty, or to
connect to highly competent firms. Because there are no increasing returns from repeated
interactions, firms can now select both options. This is why the spatial strength index is very
low, and the reachability of the network is one in an exploration regime. In short, the networks
are very dense, as expected.
4.10
One interesting result in this regime is that when technological opportunities are high, network
centrality is higher. There are some firms who benefit from their distant connections more than
other firms because of relative knowledge levels. This gives them more chances to innovate. In
this way, they become more attractive to other members of the network. When knowledge is
codified, its transfer is easier, so overall knowledge differences among the firms do not grow
too much. As knowledge gets more and more tacit, star firms strengthen their position in the
network, because their knowledge easily exceeds that of other firms. In other words, only these
firms can make use of technological opportunities in the industry while others are attracted to
them without being able to learn too much and by falling further behind (see axiom AD3). In
this way, higher tacitness and technological opportunities generate stars in the industry as
revealed by higher centrality measures in Figure 5.
 Conclusion
5.1
In the economics literature the recent decade has witnessed a surge of interest in interacting
agents models, which suggest that the classical general equilibrium approach with its emphasis
on the behavior of a representative agent is quite inappropriate in modeling aggregate
economic and social behavior. Any attempt to explain aggregate patterns has to take into
account the particular interaction structure among heterogeneous agents, and how it evolves
over time. In this paper, we follow a similar approach taking network structure to be an
emergent property resulting from the interaction of knowledge embodying firms. In other
words, adopting a bottom-up approach is a promising avenue to investigate the self-
organizing process of network formation under different conditions of the industry.
5.2
In general, simulation models enable a wide range of experimentation possibilities despite their
abstractness. In this sense, this paper is not an exception. There are some shortcomings of the
model, which can be considered in future research. In particular, one can investigate a regime in
which firms are both explorers and exploiters simultaneously. Another extension of the model
could be the case in which the tacitness of the industry undergoes change as interactions
proceed. Nevertheless, the simulation model in this paper reveals some interesting dynamics
related to emerging network structures under different industry conditions. It remains to future
research to test empirically the results of the model in different industrial settings.
5.3
According to the results of the paper in a world where we can distinguish between two regimesAccording to the results of the paper in a world where we can distinguish between two regimes
as an exploitation regime and an exploration regime, different network structures emerge
depending on technological opportunities and extent of tacitness of knowledge. In an
exploitation regime, the environment is stable, and value of a collaboration and learning
increases as firms meet more with each other and with those who are close to themselves. Here
we assume that the environment is rather stable. On the other hand, in an exploration regime,
the environment is turbulent, so opportunity cost of committing to a single close firm is higher,
in terms of foregone access to novel knowledge residing elsewhere in the network. In this case,
firms do not want to interact repeatedly, rather they search for novel and distant partners.
5.4
In an exploitation regime, networks are composed more of strong ties, where firms interact
repeatedly with geographically close firms. In this regime, high technological opportunities and
codified knowledge result in the emergence of local star firms. When knowledge gets more tacit,
local stars become global stars in the network who are more competent than other firms. Our
results imply that in an exploitation regime, firms who are similar to each other in terms of their
knowledge level should be in the same vicinity to capture the most of technological
opportunities. When knowledge is highly tacit, too much diversity in knowledge reduces the
chances to capture technological opportunities, and increases the knowledge gap among actors,
producing local and global star firms.
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Notes
1 In the real world firms might find it useful to explore and exploit simultaneously. Therefore
although such a strict differentiation might be considered unrealistic, for purposes of clarity, we
include this assumption to reflect a general tendency of firm behaviour in different
environments.
2 The firms are knowledge intensive firms, where their contacts with other firms in the industry
are important mechanisms for organizational learning and increasing their innovative capacity.
3 See Appendix for derivatives.
4 Here, we use the time subscript (t+1) because this updated knowledge level will be used in the
partner selection process of the next period (t+1).
5 To calculate reachability in the network, the software UCINET was used (Borgatti et. al. 2002).
 Appendix
A.2
In an exploitation regime, given a certain level of the partners knowledge, the value that a firm
assigns to its interaction with another firm (given by s(h,d) in Equation 1) is positively related
with the number of times they have met in the past (h) and negatively related with the distance
between them (d). This can be shown taking the first derivative of s(.,.) with respect to h/d:
A.3
As the number of meetings between two firms increase, the marginal value of each meeting first
increases and then falls. This implies that in the beginning two firms will have more
contribution to make to each other, and soon after the marginal contribution starts falling.
A.4
For these purposes, the second derivative of the function s(.,.) with respect to h and d is as
follows:
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